MINimalist ERudite VAde mecum

A review of publications concerning international studies and various issues of social interest.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute | Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Overview of Document:

Natural resource driven conflict has caught more public attention in recent times, thanks largely to much work by human rights groups. Whether it’s diamonds, oil, timber, or any other natural resource, there is always something to fight over. This publication reviews the causes of such conflicts and challenges in ending such types of conflicts. It also presents two case studies where resource conflicts have taken place, or still is: Sierra Leone (SLE) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (COD).

The publication breaks down three main issues regarding natural resource conflicts:

1. Environmental Scarcity: This is where there isn’t enough of a natural resource to go around, such as fresh water, cropland, etc. An example of where this is a source of conflict is in Sudan (SDN). Unequal distribution of such resources also exacerbates problems in this situation. The causes could simply be that the resource is non-renewable, population impact, or environmental degradation.

2. Resource Abundance: This is also known as the resource curse. Marginalized or insurgent groups make areas rich with resources targets for control to fund their activities. There is also problems with corruption where accountability mechanisms are weak, damaging the credibility of the government, encouraging unrest.

3. Political Ecology: This is partly a combination of the first two reasons, but focuses less on the environment, and more on the political and social structures that provide access, control, and distribution of the resources. One observation made is how the post-independence states refined and inherited the colonial system.

The publication then presents two cases studies with the three issues regarding natural resource conflicts and how it affects conflict resolution: SLE and COD.

The main points are as follows:

- Corruption and poor administration of natural resources tend to be the main causes of conflicts, and the struggle to control it exacerbates and becomes the focus of the conflict.

- Accommodating rebel groups does not work. It does little to remove forced labor and exploitation of artisan miners (local miners, non-industrial). In the case of the COD, it allows rebel groups to continue surviving and gives little motivation for them to integrate into the state military post-conflict.

- There is a need to balance out industrial mining with those of the artisan miners. However, simply handing out more licenses is not the solution. There is a need to coordinate with local government and decentralize control. However, the challenge is removing the system of patronage that is common in tribal systems that foster corruption, which is a source of the conflict itself.

Analysis and Review

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute | Resource-Conflict Links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo covers additional points, but there is no need to rewrite it, as it is a fairly short publication.

The most interesting aspect of the publication is its attempt to look at resource conflicts through three main issues that are typically related to such conflicts. The case studies show that the resource abundance and political ecology play major roles in these conflicts. It would have been great to add Darfur to this issue, as the scarcity of water plays a big role in the conflict.

What seems missing is a larger focus on corruption at the higher levels of government. A more detailed explanation of how post-independence governments of Africa and other developing nations have supplanted the colonial powers but did not change the system. Lack of transparency, a system of patronage, these are leftovers of a colonial government that many in power in developing nations claim to be against, but in reality continue. Sometimes, in the case of tribal systems, are defended in the name of “culture.” Not all aspects of culture need to be retained, are positive, or are compatible with a modern functional state that provides for its citizenry.

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The document is available at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute website (http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=364). Minimalist erudite vade mecum does not distribute copyrighted material. Should the publication no longer be accessible, the user can contact the publisher of the document.

Filed under: Africa , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Center for Economic and Policy Research | The Chávez Administration at 10 Years: The Economy and Social Indicators

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Overview of Document:

What has been the quantitative evidence of Hugo Chávez’s social programs in Venezuela? Chávez’s rise to power and popularity among his supporters was his promise to help the poor. Chávez’s ideological roots stem from a mix of socialism and Bolivarian romanticism.

This publication provides quantitative data and some light analysis of Chávez’s performance as the Venezuelan (VEN) president. It is review of VEN’s economy and social information for the ten years he was in power.

1. VEN’s economy has shown steady positive growth for the past five years. In 2003, the VEN GDP dropped to its lowest point, but coincided with political events. The oil strike crippled the VEN economy and rebounded after Chávez nationalized PDVSA.

2. The rest shows quantitative information about poverty reduction, education, health, access to clean water and sanitation, social security, etc.

The publication is short and self-explanatory.

Analysis and Review

The Center for Economic and Policy Research | Chávez Administration at 10 Years: The Economy and Social Indicators appears to be a response to Francisco Rodríguez’s analysis of VEN. His article can be found either in Foreign Affairs here: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63220/francisco-rodríguez/an-empty-revolution, but it requires a subscription. If you do not have a subscription, there is a shorter version on New York Times here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/opinion/27iht-edrodroguez.html?_r=1.

Francisco Rodríguez criticized the VEN’s success to an oil boom, and stated that all the increases to the social welfare and economic growth can be attributed to it. Rodríguez claims that none of the improvements are inconsistent with what any type of government in VEN would have accomplished during an oil boom. Rodríguez points out that a disproportionate amount of spending has gone to increasing the bureaucracy in VEN. Rodríguez claims that if Chávez was genuinely interested in helping the poor, more of the government spending would have went to the social programs.

This publication does provide quantitative facts of VEN’s growth and social improvements. However, it does not offer qualitative analysis in confirming or denying if the growth is consistent with an oil boom or not. Is Chávez’s planning really encouraging growth? How long will this last? History has shown that countries that rely on natural resources fail to diversify their economy. What will happen once the oil runs out? The economy experiences shocks to the commodity market? The publication does point this out and does satisfy Rodríguez’s demand for quantifiable evidence. For those interested in macroeconomic analysis, the Center for Economic and Policy Research has more of these.

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The document is available at the Center for Economic and Policy Research website (http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-chavez-administration-at-10-years:-the-economy-and-social-indicators/). Minimalist erudite vade mecum does not distribute copyrighted material. Should the publication no longer be accessible, the user can contact the publisher of the document.

Filed under: Americas , , , , , , ,

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik | Foreign Policy as Provocation: Rhetoric and Reality in Venezuela’s External Relations Under Hugo Chávez

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Overview of Document:

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (VEN) has made an impression with confrontational behavior on the world stage. Internally he has nationalized certain industries and adopted a socialist ideology mixed in with Bolivarian romanticism. Critics see Chavez leading VEN through autocratic populism, while supporters see him as a bulwark against exploitation by the industrialized nations (specifically the US). This publication compares the rhetoric to the reality of VEN’s foreign policy.

Chávez’s behavior on the international stage has been one of provocation, and appears to be nothing more than “populist theatrics.” However, it has been an effective strategy that serves to do two things:

1. It personalizes the conflict of interest to individual adversaries. It ends up simplifying the foreign policies of states, when in reality the issues are far more complex.

2. It polarizes the issues to an us versus them argument. The disenfranchised, whether they are states, or individuals within states, respond well to Chávez.

Although Chávez does not always get his way, he has been quite a nuisance for the United States. VEN’s oil and natural gas makes it an important player in international affairs. Coupled with the aid it provides to various countries (including the poor in the US), VEN cannot be simply ignored.

Still for the short and medium term, VEN does not pose a significant threat. In some cases, the rhetoric is just that, rhetoric and does not reflect reality. A few points to highlight from the publication:

- In the foreseeable future VEN cannot break from selling oil to the US despite the periodical threats. VEN lacks the proper transport ships, and its relationship with Colombia (COL) is strained, putting the pipelines going west into question. Additionally, VEN is not capable of refining the heavy crude oil itself, and relies on the US for this as well. Considering that VEN’s economy is heavily dependent on the petro-industry, it cannot seriously consider cutting off oil sales to the US. Any efforts made by Chávez to construct refineries and buy tankers can only work in the medium term. VEN will continue to depend on the US demand for its oil.

- In the short to medium term, VEN does not have the military capabilities to challenge US power in the region. Not only are countries such as Spain (ESP) and Brazil (BRA) not always willing to sell weapons to VEN, but repair parts as well. However, VEN has been willing to host Russian (RUS) warships and bombers. In the long term VEN may be willing to allow itself to be a conduit for other powers, presenting a problem for the US.

- VEN’s desire to establish new regional institutions have been mixed. If anything, it has been hampered by BRA. BRA has taken a different approach than the US, by joining VEN’s initiatives and steering it from within. It is clear however, that Chávez’s rhetoric resonates with many of the American nations. It especially resonates with the poor and disaffected within those countries, and VEN fosters relationships with them.

The publication covers much more and examines how Chávez’s ideology shapes VEN’s foreign policy.

Analysis and Review

The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik | Foreign Policy as Provocation: Rhetoric and Reality in Venezuela’s External Relations Under Hugo Chávez is short but contains much information on VEN’s policies. It is important to examine states like VEN as rational actors, to determine what exactly they are seeking. What makes this publication interesting is that it is written from the European perspective, who are attacked from time to time by Chávez, but not as vehemently as he does the US.

The publication makes an interesting point that Chávez and VEN’s support for organizations such as the FARC (the document mentions ideological support), is to distract from domestic problems, of which there are many.

What remains to be seen is how the US interacts with VEN under the Obama Administration. The US under the Bush administration met Chávez’s attacks with rhetoric of its own. In many ways, US reaction to Chávez’s attacks served its intended purpose. Ignoring Chávez on the other hand, would take away the sensationalist ideological battle between the US and VEN away from him. As VEN faces serious problems internally, it would do well for the US to be as invisible as possible.

This publication provides great information on VEN’s behavior in international relations, but considering that outside the ideology, its foreign policy capabilities rests largely on their oil trade. It is through its oil trade that VEN can project its “soft power.” An economic study of VEN is also needed to supplement this.

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The document is available at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik website (http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/produkte/swp_studie.php?id=10201&PHPSESSID=6caab253dc54a6023aae7b73aa6b1497). Minimalist erudite vade mecum does not distribute copyrighted material. Should the publication no longer be accessible, the user can contact the publisher of the document.

Filed under: Americas , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs | Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict

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Overview of Document:

Energy security is becoming a more important issue as global demand for energy is increasing, mainly through China (CHN) and India (IND) but other industrializing nations as well. This is a short publication on how states deal with each other when transporting fuel across borders via pipelines, and the conflicts they cause.

It is a short publication but a few highlights:

- Pipelines will become more important as global demand is set to increase and known reserves near the demand areas are depleting, meaning that energy will need to be acquired from further away.

- Natural gas is much more complicated to transport and there are few alternatives, none that are currently cost effective. Oil on the other hand can still be transported through ships. However, landlocked countries will still need to utilize pipelines to transport to markets or the high seas, regardless of the type of resource.

- There is no governing body with the jurisdiction to mediate between states does not exist. However the publication recommends the use of the WTO or the Energy Charter Treaty.

- The majority of conflicts arising from pipelines come from the transit country, where although they may use some of the resource, it is not the final destination of the resource. The conflicts sometimes involve political reasons but the publication article argues that it is largely economic. Because there is no standard for determining transit fees, as the commodity prices and other factors change, the transit countries are likely to demand a bigger share of the profits. Intransigence by the transit country is likely to occur in these scenarios. The Ukraine (UKR) and Russia (RUS) natural gas pipeline is an example of this. The publication offers some recommendations on solving the problems of determining fees for the transit country, but also for deterring transit countries from holding the pipelines hostage.

- The publication also offers alternative means to transporting natural gas, as it is the most challenging but shows that none are really cost effective at the moment unless technological advances happen to offset the costs.

There is a bit more but these are the main highlights of the publication.

Analysis and Review

The Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs | Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict is short and an easy read. There is not much to analyze or review. Anyone interested in energy security should read this as it provides some insight to some of the challenges that laying pipe pose.

The interesting thing is that I thought the Russians were being the aggressive ones when dealing with the UKR over the natural gas supplies.  This is an issue that Western Europe cannot ignore as many of them rely on natural gas from the East. The publication shows that UKR were the ones that held much of Europe hostage in order to negotiate better terms. The solutions are the most interesting portion of the document to read, especially when avoiding the “obsolescing bargain” where the transit country becomes intransigent to gain better terms.

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The document is available at the Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs website (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/712/). Minimalist erudite vade mecum does not distribute copyrighted material. Should the publication no longer be accessible, the user can contact the publisher of the document.

Filed under: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Multinational Corporations , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy

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Overview of Document:

Since Pervez Musharraf’s resignation, Pakistan (PAK) has since transitioned to a democratic system of government. However, it is still a country divided and plagued by violence, both political and religious motivated. This publication briefly examines the fractured politics of PAK and the role Pakistani intelligence has played in this. If PAK expects to sustain a democracy, it will need to transfer control of the intelligence agencies and ensure that the military does not meddle into domestic politics.

There are three major sections to this publication:

1. A brief history of Pakistani intelligence agencies and some basic information regarding the different agencies: Military Intelligence (MI), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and many more. Additionally, it provides some information on the intelligence agencies’ involvement in domestic politics, and the strategy of dividing and balancing different interest groups against one another to gain support. Essentially, the Pakistani intelligence agencies, while in competition with one another at times, are not rogue elements. Instead they have historically responded well to the orders of the military, namely the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Previous attempts by civilian governments to regain control, and oversight over the intelligence agencies in accordance with the constitution have ended in failure. Civilian governments have shown a lack of knowledge in the field of intelligence, and appointees have been largely ignored and sidelined by the intelligence agencies.

2. A comparative analysis of PAK’s transition to democracy and the challenges it faces in reforming its intelligence agencies to those of Indonesia (IDN) and Chile (CHL). While neither IDN, nor CHL’s transition and reform has been perfect, they have made strides. Both IDN and CHL were authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, where their intelligence agencies were used to manage internal politics, conduct internal surveillance, and “deal” with dissidents. Since their democratization, both countries have approached the reform differently, and have gotten varied results. The idea is that there are lessons to be learned from those experiences that can be applied to PAK, and that PAK’s case is not particular.

3. The conclusion derives some lessons from IDN and CHL’s transitions. The main point to take from this is that any reform of the intelligence services will take quite a bit of time, and will need to take into account of the current balance of power within PAK. Recommendations are included.

Analysis and Review

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy is not too difficult to read, except for the background information portion. Some existing knowledge of Pakistani history and politics will help, as the publication does not take time to explain it. Existing knowledge of Chilean and Indonesian would help for the comparative analysis portion, but not necessary as the publication does not delve to deeply in the politics of those nations.

The Pakistani intelligence agencies’ past history of using divide and conquer tactics to maintain a balance of power between special interests is problematic. However, past history has shown that the agencies do not have full control of them, and requires them to throw support behind splinter groups to balance rogue groups out. It becomes a vicious cycle. What makes this disturbing is that even after the return of democracy in Pakistan, changes are not being made.

Recently, the Pakistani Army has fought an offensive against the Taliban in the Northwest Frontier Province. For this, they have gained the support and backed splinter elements of the Taliban and other Islamic extremists. The vicious cycle continues.

The report also places a lot of the responsibility of the intelligence agencies’ behavior on the military. However, Fatima Bhutto, niece of the recently killed Benazir Bhutto, and daughter of assassinated Murtaza Bhutto, provides an interesting insight. Apparently the civilian governments are also not immune from using the intelligence and security agencies for political purposes. She believes that her father was assassinated with her aunt Benazir Bhutto’s knowledge (Murtaza Bhutto was a critic of Benazir and was campaigning against her). Her views on the matter can be found at: http://www.guernicamag.com/spotlight/1110/in_my_place/. She paints a bleak picture on the current president, Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s husband and successor to her campaign.

Pakistan is in a complicated situation, and as the US focus turns towards Afghanistan, PAK’s role will be one to watch. They can either be spoilers or stakeholders, but how PAK’s democracy develops from this point will determine this.

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The document is available at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22817&prog=zgp&proj=zsa). Minimalist erudite vade mecum does not distribute copyrighted material. Should the publication no longer be accessible, the user can contact the publisher of the document.

Filed under: Americas, Asia , , , , , , , , , , ,