Privatizing Force | PMCs are double edged swords for international security

Now that we have discussed the need and utility that private military companies (PMC) serve for the US, we will also go ahead and assume that the same largely holds true for many developed countries where maintaining an expensive military is not palatable to their voting public. Additionally, it also holds true that citizens of countries are not going to be too happy about having their military service members killed in action overseas, especially if the conflict is unpopular domestically for whatever reason it may be.

But developed countries are not the only ones that hire PMCs. Developing countries, and more specifically countries with an “unreliable” security environment present a security gap that PMCs are able to fill. There are two kinds of “unreliable” security environments that demonstrates that PMCs are double edged swords. But before we start that, I will briefly discuss the nature of the international system.

The international relations system is about self-preservation.

Regardless of whichever theoretical construct of international relations you subscribe to (i.e. realism, liberalism, marxism, etc.), one cannot deny that every country strives for self-preservation in the international system. But it is more specific than a country, it is the state (the government of a country) that seeks to survive in an international system where a world government does not exist. This is called anarchy, or in political theory terms: the state of nature.

In such a scenario, even with the idea of collective security, where countries form alliances to help each other in dire times, there is no guarantee that such help will come when it is necessary. Why countries might not come to the aid of an ally is a subject of another discussion but I’m fairly certain it is obvious that this happens.

The UN’s role in providing a platform for collective security among member states is embodied in the UN Charter, where in the event of a conflict, the issue is to be referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and a course of action to end it is supposed to be determined and carried out by the member states. It must be understood that the UN is not a world government and that there are other intergovernmental organizations (IGO) that are designed for collective security.

But this leads us into the first “edge” of that sword.

PMCs as guarantors of state survival.

The best example in contemporary times that demonstrates what happens when collective security fails and PMCs step in to help in dire times is the Sierra Leone conflict (1991-2002).

When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started their rebellion in Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leonean state was not only caught by surprise, its security forces had already been hollowed out by the kleptocratic regime of Siaka Stevens and the system of patronage. As a result, the RUF rebellion spread quickly and virtually unchecked. The Sierra Leonean state, after not only failing to stop the RUF but also failing at protecting its civilian population, was in danger of losing Sierra Leone to the RUF.

President Valentine Strasser did exactly what he was supposed to do: he requested the support of the UN to help in stopping the rebellion by the RUF. And the UNSC did nothing. Well not exactly nothing, the UNSC simply left the regional organization, the Economic Community of West Africa States to respond with their combined armed forces called the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The ECOMOG also proved to be insufficient in stopping the RUF. So, conflict raged on fueled by blood diamonds, while the most capable militaries that would be able to stop the conflict were not obligated to act.

Who else was the Sierra Leonean state to turn to? By not taking any effective action on the RUF rebellion, the UN and the international community forced the Sierra Leonean state to rely on whoever would come to their aid: PMCs, specifically Executive Outcomes (EO). EO brought with it a host of problems but it did beat back the RUF to the borders of Sierra Leone. The rest of the Sierra Leone conflict and details as to what led to it can be found in Lansana Gberie’s book: A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone.

The point is that PMCs are a useful tool for states to have when their own security apparatus fails, and with no guarantee that collective security IGOs will come to their aid, it is a tool that states will want to have available. This is the one of two “unreliable” security scenarios where PMCs can fill the void.

The suppression of self-determination.

The second “unreliable” security scenario, or the other “edge” is when a state cannot rely on its military to suppress the will of its people. You don’t have to look hard to see where this is taking place. You can look at Libya and see how Qadaffi had purposely kept the military weak to prevent them from conducting a coup, and instead relies on paramilitary forces and mercenaries (REF: BBC | Libya: Who is propping up Gaddafi?).

Or Bahrain, where Pakistani freelancers are part of the Bahraini security forces which were used to suppress the pro-democracy protesters there (REF: Newsweek Pakistan | Bahrain or Bust? Pakistan should think twice before meddling in the Middle East).

Or Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi National Guard (SANG) serves as a special praetorian guard for the House of Al-Saud from coups, but importantly to guard against dissidents, as they did during the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The SANG is trained by an American PMC called Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumann (REF: Northrop Grumman Confirms Nine Employees Killed In Saudi Arabia Terrorist Attack). The effects of this and other factors will be covered at a later date when discussing terrorism.

The function of Erik Prince’s new PMC Reflex Responses will be the same in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the original reporting by the New York Times, the tasks of Reflex Responses does include

 “crowd-control operations” where the crowd “is not armed with firearms but does pose a risk using improvised weapons (clubs and stones).”

People involved in the project and American officials said that the Emiratis were interested in deploying the battalion to respond to terrorist attacks and put down uprisings inside the country’s sprawling labor camps, which house the Pakistanis, Filipinos and other foreigners who make up the bulk of the country’s work force.*

(REF: New York Times | Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder).

It might be easy to say that in this case, the country’s workforce are not citizens so it is not about suppressing self-determination and pro-democracy movements. The first statement does not specify enough to exclude citizens. The second statement is also troubling. Any cursory research on the working conditions of imported labor in the Gulf region will show that allegations of worker exploitation is not uncommon. Is Reflex Responses going to be used to suppress complaints and enforce exploitation? Worst case scenario, enforce modern day form of slavery?

It is interesting that responding to terrorist attacks is one of the tasks that Reflex Responses is supposedly going to cover. But how do we delineate when an uprising is terrorism or not? Will that be up to them or UAE? Considering who is paying, it is likely that Reflex Responses will define the problem as it suits their clients (remember the how PMCs are driven by profit first and foremost?).

Examining both “unreliable” security environments, you can see that PMCs really are double edged swords and it will come down to determining how to regulate them for the purpose of improving international security without supressing self-determination. 

Filed under: Conflict, Governance, Bahrain, Collective Sercurity, Erik Prince, Exploitation, freelancers, Lansana Gberie, Libya, Northrup Grumann, Pakistan, PMC, PMSC, Private Military Companies, Private Security Companies, Reflex Responses, SANG, Saudi National Guard, Security, Sierra Leone, UN, United Arab Emirates, Vinnell

Privatizing Force | Need and Utility

Let’s continue on with the discussion regarding private military and security companies from yesterday (REF: Erik Prince and Reflex Responses | Privatizing the State’s Monopoly on the Use of Force).

To maintain some clarity,  I am going to define my terms in this discussion. The term Private Military Company (PMC) will include private military companies (of course), private security companies, logistics and training companies. Also, freelancers will be used in lieu of mercenary (because by current conventions they are not), and contractors (because individuals contracted directly by the Department of Defense are not the same as those hired by PMCs).

I know there are differences between each and normally I wouldn’t lump them in one group, but for the purpose of this discussion it will do.

I am not advocating banning PMCs, but the status quo will not do. The growth of the PMC industry and their integration into many modern armies show that to a certain extent, PMCs serve a need or utility. There is a third reason why but I will get to it another time. There is also a place for them in the international security space but that will also have to be discussed at another time. For now I will focus on why the US and Western countries use them.

Now you might think that need and utility is the same thing but they are not. Allow me to explain.

During President Clinton’s administration the US military started to privatize a lot of its functions out to PMCs. Logistics, intelligence, training, etc. This tradition continued into President Bush Jr.’s administration which also included the Department of State’s (DoS) Worldwide Personnel Protective Services (WPPS) designed to protect its employees.

Operation Just Cause (Panama), Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) showed that US military operations and interventions were short and effective. In the case of Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), it seemed that once the US recognized a strategic blunder or realized that it was not in its interest, it would be able to back out.

Considering the large cost of maintaining a large standing military,  the logic of privatizing some functions of force projection and force protection makes sense. After all, when the US does get involved in foreign adventures (or misadventures depending on your perspective), it can supplement some of the functions to PMCs and then drop them when they are no longer necessary. The military also underwent a restructuring to make it more flexible for both rapid deployment and “efficient”* combat support. For those of us who were in the service, some witnessed the transformation from a Division oriented structure to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). Some of us were also around when during the Clinton administration, they were pushing out people out of the military and downsizing in personnel (this does not include me by the way, I joined late into his administration).

And it was a great idea. That is until 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan, and then later on the invasion of Iraq. Suddenly, the US military realized that it had a shortage of not just personnel (thanks Rumsfeld, Iraq could be pacified with how many again?) but also specific skill sets. But that was the void PMCs were supposed to fill, so no problem right?

Except that both wars have now dragged on for a decade. PMCs and freelancers don’t come cheap and for good reason. Remember the previous blog post? How it’s about the money? But the idea was that these guys (and gals) won’t always be working if the US is only involved in short engagements. Their skillsets are specialized and with the risk involved its a fair compensation…until it creates a cycle of dependence.

And this is where NEED comes into play. 

I have to give PW Singer of the Brookings Institute a lot of credit here. In his book Corporate Warriors, he shows that PMCs don’t have a high overhead cost when it comes to hiring freelancers. They don’t really have to train them (depends on the skillset of course) because they hire right out of the military. And they hire all types of job skillsets. With the promise of better pay and the ability to leave anytime, there is no shortage of takers. So who loses out? The military of course has the high overhead costs in training new troops and cannot compete with the salaries offered by PMCs. The military does not allow its members to leave before their term of service is completed. And this may seem contradictory, but members of the military has had to do several deployments with little stabilization time.

Altogether, the military has a hard time with retention. This is not just the US military. I am not going to insult your intelligence here so I will assume that you can see the vicious cycle of dependency here. And this is a cycle that becomes harder to break.

So what do I mean by UTILITY?

So what do I mean by utility? When I use utility, I mean that in lieu of other options (such as US military service members), PMCs offer something extra that makes them preferable, even when they may not be necessary. So while the NEED has been established because of the vicious cycle, there is something about PMCs that gives them greater utility than US military service members as well.

I hate to be crass but the utility of PMCs and freelancers is that nobody cares if they get killed. To start with, there is no reliable statistic as to how many PMC freelancers were killed in action in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. They are not all American or Western European citizens, PMCs tend to also hire local nationals and third country nationals (TCN) from other countries to cut down on costs.

So when President Bush Jr. and later on President Obama continues to use PMCs in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are buying political capital. The death of an American military service member invokes quite a bit of emotional reaction, and being that the US government does maintain accurate statistics on those, it is easier for the public to quantify the costs of the wars to the country (and I don’t mean that in a money way).

How many American voters care about the local Iraqi freelancers that were employed by the PMCs? What about the Salvadoreans, the Fijians, the Chileans, the Filipinos, etc.? This argumentation was made well by…you guessed it, PW Singer in this article: Brookings Institution | Can’t Win with ‘Em, Can’t Go To War without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency.

Also, how do people view PMC freelancers, even though they are Americans? I would venture a guess that those who see them as mercenaries and simply doing this for money would say that they got what they deserved. Or that they took the risk and it didn’t pay off. Either way there seems to be little sympathy for them. PMCs that fail or get whole teams wiped out are not required to do much for the surviving members of those families. Those details are stipulated over contracts. There is a large body of literature that shows examples of this but if there is a good book to read on that: Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq by journalist Steve Fainaru, who covered the Crescent Security Group team that was taken hostage in Iraq. Think of the Blackwater team that was strung up in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. What do their families think about the whole thing and where is the support group for them?

So Need, Utility and the Third Reason?

Tony Geraghty, author of Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare covers PMCs as deniable elements for state interests. He focuses mostly on the British usage of PMCs and mercenaries but does mention some American involvement in the practice. This can be discussed more at a later date but in short: Erik Prince and Reflex Responses ARE NOT being used in that manner. If so, it is a stupid way to go about it because people know who he is.

* We will cover why the use of quotations around the word efficient. For those who want to look and think ahead: find out what cost-plus contracts are and you will see the irony of the use of the word efficient here. It might even make you depressed actually.

Filed under: Conflict, Governance, contractors, Erik Prince, Force Restructuring, freelancers, mercenaries, PMC, PMSC, Private Military Companies, Private Security Companies, PSC, PW Singer, Reflex Responses, Steve Fainaru, Tony Geraghty

Erik Prince and Reflex Responses | Privatizing the State’s Monopoly on the Use of Force

Let’s get this out of the way first: Erik Prince and Reflex Responses is driven primarily by profit, NOT by patriotism. Any private military or security company is driven by profit because ultimately it is a business and this needs to be understood first and foremost.

The reason why that has to be established first and foremost is because discussions about private military companies, private security companies, mercenaries, freelancers, contractors, whatever you want to call them, are muddled by thinking they are driven by anything else than monetary gain. This is not to say that some have other reasons, but they wouldn’t be doing this if it weren’t for the money. Otherwise, guys like Prince would still be in the military.

The privatization of force is not something that can really be discussed in one blog entry (it took 75 pages for my undergraduate thesis and I didn’t even really get to make a dent in exhausting the issues that surround this industry). I will however focus on two main points regarding these companies in light of Erik Prince’s alleged new venture. (REF: NY Times | Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder).

Prince’s ability to start new companies is a reflection of weak regulations and enforcement. The “let the markets decide” and self-regulation argument DOES NOT work.

One of the major arguments by the “let the markets decide” and the self-regulation camp is that private military companies, in the interest of drumming up future business, will not want to have a negative brand image of human rights violations or war crimes. After all, companies are a brand conscious bunch and they do not want to be cut out of future deals because of all the bad press that would be related to it. Additionally, nobody wants to be charged with and imprisoned for war crimes either.

Except that Prince’s ability to either get involved with other companies such as Saracen in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia, and his current venture, Reflex Responses, tells us that the key players in a company that stand to invest and make money don’t give a crap about brand image. Why? Because as Prince has shown, it is really easy to just sell the damn company and get involved somewhere else. Granted Blackwater lost its biggest cash cow in Iraq, Prince made millions in a short span of time. By selling the company Prince can now move on to investing elsewhere.

Like the Saracen and Reflex Responses ventures. Where is the deterrence towards individuals like Prince and other investors from putting their money into such companies? Where is the incentive to ensure strict compliance to Rules of Engagement or the Laws of War?

PW Singer from the Brookings Institute wrote a book called “Corporate Warriors” that pretty much outlined this problem (among others) regarding private military companies. The book came out around during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The newer versions of the book has an additional chapter on what he thinks about contractors in Iraq, since the original book did not include the Iraq War.

Was Singer a prophet? Did he have amazing foresight on these matters? No. There were plenty of examples of how self regulation and market forces deciding that did not work. Just think of the Executive Outcomes (EO) members in Angola and then Sierra Leone. How many of the former members just went ahead and made other companies. Out of EO some members made Sandline International, which were kicked out Sierra Leone after a scandal over arms embargoes that got the British Foreign Secretary fired. Where are they now? I will list them all another time but they all just made new companies and are operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, and worldwide.

Singer was just pointing out the obvious and yet there are those that think self-regulation and market forces work.

Reflex Responses is precisely what the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries sought to guard against.

The purpose of the Convention was to prevent states from using mercenaries to suppress the self-determination of peoples. Now, the Convention fails to actually define what a mercenary is that can be properly applied. In fact, Reflex Responses and other private military companies would not be classified as mercenaries through the convention’s definitions.

So fine, let’s not call them mercenaries. De jure we cannot do so, even if they are de facto mercenaries.

But let’s discuss what the purpose of the convention was for and what Reflex Responses does….No let’s just say it. Their purpose and use are not any different from them mercenaries used by Qadaffi to assault rebel positions, nor are they different from the Pakistani “security” contractors in Bahrain that were being used to crush the protests there as well.  Okay there is a difference: level of training. It’s important that we stay honest here.

So to put it simply, states that are afraid to rely on their military to crush unrest (could be rabble rousers, could be pro-democracy movements) will rely on hired guns. You can package it nicely if you’d like by calling it something other than hired guns or mercenaries, but the purpose they serve is the same. I mean what regime wants to end up like Mubarak? Where he could not even get the army to crush the uprising. The Bahraini’s seems to have invested well in Pakistanis. And now it looks like the United Arab Emirates are planning the same with Reflex Responses.

What is funny is that there are those who talk about how the government encroaches into people’s lives. People who think of Guy Fawkes or other American Revolutionary War figures about how the government should fear and respond to its people.

And they are completely ok with people like Prince and the type of services he provides.

I will resume further discussion another day (tomorrow?), but there is simply too much ground to cover with all this.

Filed under: Conflict, Governance, Blackwater, Companies, Erik Prince, Force, Military, Pakistan, PMC, Private, Privatization, Reflex Responses, Regulation, Saracen, Security, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emirates, Xe